Existence of Equilibrium in Repeated Blackwell Games when the Payoff is Tail Measurable
Seminar
Speaker
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan
Date
22/11/2020 - 13:00 - 12:00Add to Calendar
2020-11-22 12:00:00
2020-11-22 13:00:00
Existence of Equilibrium in Repeated Blackwell Games when the Payoff is Tail Measurable
We prove the existence of equilibrium in repeated Blackwell games with Borel tail-measurable winning sets, and with Borel tail-measurable payoffs. The proof uses a regularity result of the minmax value
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אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - Department of Mathematics
mathoffice@math.biu.ac.il
Asia/Jerusalem
public
Place
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Abstract
We prove the existence of equilibrium in repeated Blackwell games with Borel tail-measurable winning sets, and with Borel tail-measurable payoffs. The proof uses a regularity result of the minmax value
Last Updated Date : 13/11/2020
