Existence of Equilibrium in Repeated Blackwell Games when the Payoff is Tail Measurable

Speaker
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan
Date
22/11/2020 - 13:00 - 12:00Add to Calendar 2020-11-22 12:00:00 2020-11-22 13:00:00 Existence of Equilibrium in Repeated Blackwell Games when the Payoff is Tail Measurable We prove the existence of equilibrium in repeated Blackwell games with Borel tail-measurable winning sets, and with Borel tail-measurable payoffs.  The proof uses a regularity result of the minmax value Zoom אוניברסיטת בר-אילן - המחלקה למתמטיקה mathoffice@math.biu.ac.il Asia/Jerusalem public
Place
Zoom
Abstract

We prove the existence of equilibrium in repeated Blackwell games with Borel tail-measurable winning sets, and with Borel tail-measurable payoffs.  The proof uses a regularity result of the minmax value

תאריך עדכון אחרון : 13/11/2020